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CALCULATION OF A POWER PRICE EQUILIBRIUM∗
MIHA TROHA† AND RAPHAEL HAUSER‡
Abstract. In this paper we propose a tractable quadratic programming formulation for calculating the equilibrium
term structure of electricity prices. We rely on a theoretical model described in [21], but extend it so that it reflects
actually traded electricity contracts, transaction costs and liquidity considerations. Our numerical simulations examine
the properties of the term structure and its dependence on various parameters of the model. The proposed quadratic
programming formulation is applied to calculate the equilibrium term structure of electricity prices in the UK power
grid consisting of a few hundred power plants. The impact of ramp up and ramp down constraints are also studied.
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1. Introduction. Since the deregulation of the electricity markets in the 1990s, the modeling of
electricity prices has attracted a lot of attention. A first approach, nowadays called the non-structural
approach, attempted to model electricity prices by using the standard techniques that had already
been developed for modeling the prices of other financial securities. The seminal paper [18] studied the
suitability of one and multi-factor Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes to model the spot price. As pointed
out in this work, Gaussian distributions alone can not be used for modeling spikes, and thus the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process was combined with a pure jump-process in [15]. An extension to more
general Levy processes has been described in [19]. However, as argued in [5], such approaches cannot
be directly used for pricing electricity derivatives, because they neglect the non-storable nature of
power. They all rely on the non-arbitrage principle and thus implicitly assume that a buy-and-hold
strategy is possible. Such an assumption is clearly not realistic for the electricity market. Thus, other
models that try to capture some of the physical properties of electricity have been proposed.
The seminal work [4] uses the supply and demand stack to calculate the electricity prices. The
model was extended in [16] and [9], where the supply stack was modeled as a function of the underlying
fuels (e.g. gas, coal, oil...) used to produce the electricity. A closed form solution for electricity
forward contracts, and for spark and dark spread options was derived. These models capture some of
the physical properties of the power markets and in the literature they are referred to as structural
approaches. However, as argued in [20], models that include the ramp up/down constraints of power
plants and long term contracts are needed in order to understand and prevent catastrophic events and
market manipulation as happened in California in 2001.
This is the motivation behind a third, game theoretic approach, that models the physical properties
and decisions of market participants more closely. The seminal work in this line of research was
produced by [6], where a dependency between a forward and a spot price in a two-stage market is
studied. The market consists of one producer and one consumer, who each aim to optimize a mean-
variance utility function. [10] used this work to study the impact of derivatives in the power market.
[8], and [7] have extended it to a multi-stage setting and derived a formula for a dynamic equilibrium.
The mean-variance objective function was replaced by a general convex risk measure in [13]. [21]
extended the work of [7] to a setting with more than one producer and consumer, who optimize
their mean-variance objective functions. In contrast to other game theoretic models, capacity and
ramp up/down constraints of power plants are included. By modeling the profit of power plants as a
difference between the power price and fuel costs together with emissions obligations, this work also
incorporates ideas from the structural approach. As in [11] and in [12], the model is consistent with
observable fuel and emission prices. However, [21] focuses only on the description of the model and on
the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the solution. In this paper, we extend the model of [21]
to include transaction costs, liquidity constraints and actually traded electricity contracts as well as
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propose a tractable quadratic programming formulation to solve it numerically. The numerical results
show the dependence of the term structure of electricity prices on various parameters of the model.
Moreover, the algorithm is applied to a realistic setting by incorporating the entire UK power grid,
consisting of a few hundred power plants.
From our model, it might not be immediately clear why market participants do not execute all
trades at the beginning of the planning horizon. One reason for spreading out the trading activity
is the availability of contracts and their liquidity: contracts with a delivery far into the future are
much less liquid than, for example, day ahead contracts. Liquidity is included in our model through
increased costs of trading (see Subsection 5.3). Another reason are delayed cash flows: when trading is
done through future contracts, some players might be interested in entering into a position later and
thus delay the associated cash flows. In this paper we mainly postulate the use of forward contracts.
A simple extension to future contracts (assuming a constant interest rate) is presented in Subsection
5.1. A third reason for delayed trading is the exploitation of a trend-following effect in the term
structure: due to risk aversion of most players, the term structure of forward or future contracts with
fixed delivery date is usually slightly upward sloping. A fourth reason are transaction costs: when
large trades, such as hedging of a whole power plant, must be executed, they must be spread over a
longer period of time to decrease transaction costs and market impact.
Our paper is organized as follows: To keep the paper self contained, we introduce the main
components of the term structure power price model presented in [21] in Section 3. A quadratic
programming formulation that can be used to calculate the price equilibrium is described in Section
4. In Section 5 we continue with various realistic extensions of the model. In Section 6, we illustrate
the forecasting power of our model through numerical experiments. In the first part of this section we
study the term structure of electricity prices on a simple example. In the second part we calculate the
equilibrium electricity price while modeling the entire system of UK power plants. We conclude the
paper in Section 7.
2. Organization of the UK Electricity Market. Electricity supply and demand must match
continuously in real-time, which makes electricity grids very difficult to manage. At a high level scale,
the UK electricity market can be divided into two different modes of operation: The first mode deals
with electricity contracts with more distant delivery periods (ranging from seasons to one hour). The
second mode is performed by the system operator (in the UK called the National Grid) responsible
for the micromanagement of the grid in the last hour before the delivery of electricity.
In the first mode electricity is traded through forward or future contracts. Forward contracts start
to be traded up to four years before delivery. This period is usually referred to as a liquid period. In
the beginning of a liquid period only seasonal contracts are available. Seasonal forward contracts are
agreements between a buyer and a seller that the seller will deliver a certain fixed amount of electricity
in every half hour during the season of interest at a price decided upon today. As we get closer to
the delivery, electricity contracts with greater granularity appear. We can find quarterly, monthly,
weekly, daily, and intra day contracts. Intra day contracts can cover blocks of twelve hours, four hours,
two hours, one hour and the smallest granularity is half an hour (see the APX power exchange1 for
details). Furthermore, various combinations of the above, such as month-ahead peak contracts, which
cover all half hours between 7am and 7pm in the following month, are traded. One could use such
contracts to hedge the production of a solar power plant, for example. As we can see there exist a huge
variety of different contracts. Some of them are traded through an exchange, while others are traded
over-the-counter (OTC). In the Wholesale Market Report2 from the Energy UK, we can see that a
large majority of contracts is traded OTC. When choosing the right contract to trade, one also has to
take into consideration liquidity and transaction costs. The Wholesale Market Reports from Energy
UK show that contracts with a delivery after two or more years tend to be very illiquid. Baseload
contracts are much more liquid than peak (i.e. 7am to 7pm) or off-peak (i.e. 7pm to 7am) contracts.
The bid-ask spread for different types of contracts between years 2008 and 2011 is available in the
Ofgem report3. Besides trading electricity through future and forward contracts, a significant amount
of electricity is also traded through day-ahead auctions. According to the Wholesale Market Report
1http://www.apxgroup.com/trading-clearing/apx-power-uk
2Report for July 2014 is available at http://www.energy-uk.org.uk/publication/finish/5-research-and-reports/1152-
wholesale-market-report-july-2014.html.
3https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/39661/summer-2011-assessment.pdf
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from Energy UK, roughly between 15% and 20% of power is traded through day-ahead auctions offered
by APX4 and N2EX5. Since the auctions are not explicitly included in our model, we will not study
them in further detail. An optimal bidding strategy for the auction market is discussed in [2] and [3].
One hour before the delivery, at the event called a Gate Closure, trading of future and forward
contracts ceases. This is when the system operator takes over the management of the power grid. All
market participants inform the system operator about their positions in future and forward contracts.
They also submit their bids and offers. A bid is a pair of volume and a price which tells the system
operator at what price a producer can increase production. Similarly, the offer tell the system oper-
ator what compensation the producer is willing to accept from the operator if asked to decrease the
production. Consumers with a flexible consumption also submit bids and offers. Equipped with this
information the system operator first compares the demand forecast with the submitted number of
traded contracts and adjusts the difference by accepting some of the bids or offers. While doing so,
the system operator must also take into account the capacity constraints of the transmission lines in
the network. After the delivery of electricity, the system operator compares the actual physical pro-
duction/consumption of electricity by each market participant with the contracted volumes adjusted
by the accepted bids and offers and calculates the imbalance volume as the difference between the two.
If the imbalance volume helped the system operator match supply and demand, then a fair, market
index price, is used to calculate the imbalance cash flow to/from each player. On the other hand, if
the imbalance volume hampered the system operator in matching supply and demand, then a worse
price6 is applied to calculate the cash flow. Roughly speaking, this price is calculated as the average
of the most expensive 500 MWh of accepted bids or offers adjusted by transmission losses.
The two modes of operation described above are very different. The first mode of operation can
be considered as a competitive market without a central agent, while the second is controlled by the
system operator who is responsible for matching the electricity supply and demand by choosing the
cheapest actions. The first mode of operation can be seen as relatively independent of the second
mode and thus, this work focuses on the first mode of the operation only. A coupling of both modes
is something that we would like to investigate in the future.
3. Problem description. In this section we provide a detailed description of a model that we
use for the purpose of modeling the term structure of electricity prices. The model belongs to a class
of game theoretic equilibrium models. Market participants are divided into consumers and producers.
A set of consumers is denoted by C and has cardinality 0 < |C| < ∞. Similarly, a set of producers
is denoted by P and has cardinality 0 < |P | < ∞. Each producer owns a portfolio of power plants
that can have different characteristics such as capacity, ramp-up and ramp-down constraints, efficiency,
and fuel type. The set of all fuel types is denoted by L. Sets Rp,l denote all power plants owned by
producer p ∈ P that run on fuel l ∈ L. A set Rp,l may be empty since each producer typically does
not own all possible types of power plants. Moreover, this allows us to include non physical traders
such as banks or speculators, who do not own any electricity generation facilities and are without a
physical demand for electricity, as producers p ∈ P with Rp,l = {} for all l ∈ L.
As we will see in Subsection 3.4, it is useful to introduce another player named the hypothetical
market agent besides producers and consumers. The hypothetical market agent plays the role of the
electricity market and ensures that the term structure of the electricity price is such that the market
clearing condition is satisfied for all electricity forward contracts.
We are interested in delivery times Tj, j ∈ J = {1, ..., T
′}, where power for each delivery time Tj
can be traded through numerous forward contracts at times ti, i ∈ Ij . The electricity price at time ti for
delivery at time Tj is denoted by Π(ti, Tj). Since contracts with trading time later than delivery time do
not exist, we require tmax{Ij} = Tj for all j ∈ J . The number of all forward contracts, i.e.
∑
j∈J |Ij |, is
denoted by N . Uncertainty is modeled by a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F = {Ft, t ∈ I} ,P), where
I = ∪j∈J Ij . The σ-algebra Ft represents information available at time t.
The exogenous variables that appear in our model are (a) aggregate power demand D (Tj) for
each delivery period j ∈ J , (b) prices of fuel forward contracts Gl (ti, Tj) for each fuel l ∈ L, delivery
period j ∈ J , and trading period i ∈ Ij , and (c) prices of emissions forward contracts Gem (ti, Tj),
4http://www.apxgroup.com/trading-clearing/auction/
5https://www.n2ex.com/
6For a detailed calculation of this price see
http://www.elexon.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/imbalance_pricing_guidance_v7.0.pdf.
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j ∈ J , i ∈ Ij . Electricity prices and all exogenous variables are assumed to be adapted to the filtration
{Ft}t∈I and have finite second moments.
Let vk ∈ R
nk , nk ∈ N, k ∈ K, and K = {1, ..., |K|} be given vectors. For convenience, we define a
vector concatenation operator as
||k∈K vk =
[
v⊤1 , ..., v
⊤
|K|
]⊤
.
3.1. Producer. Each producer p ∈ P participates in the electricity, fuel, and emission markets.
Forward as well as spot contracts are available on all markets. Electricity prices, fuel prices, and
emission prices are denoted by Π(ti, Tj), Gl (ti, Tj) where l ∈ L, and Gem (ti, Tj), respectively. To
simplify the notation, we introduce
• electricity price vectors Π(Tj) = ||i∈Ij Π(ti, Tj), and Π = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjΠ(Tj), where rˆ ∈ R is a
constant interest rate,
• fuel price vectors G (ti, Tj) = ||l∈LGl (ti, Tj), G (Tj) = ||i∈Ij G (ti, Tj), and
G = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjG (Tj),
• emission price vector Gem (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Gem (ti, Tj), and Gem = ||j∈J e
−rˆTjGem (Tj).
A producer may participate in the market by buying and selling forward and spot contracts. The
number of electricity forward contracts that producer p ∈ P buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for
delivery at time Tj, j ∈ J is denoted by Vp (ti, Tj). Similarly, the number of fuel and emission forward
contracts that producer p ∈ P buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for delivery at time Tj , j ∈ J is denoted
by Fp,l (ti, Tj), l ∈ L and Op (ti, Tj), respectively. Producers own a generally non-empty portfolio of
power plants. The actual production of electricity from power plant r ∈ Rp,l at delivery time Tj, j ∈ J
is denoted by Wp,l,r (Tj).
The notation is greatly simplified if the decision variables are concatenated into
• electricity trading vectors Vp (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Vp (ti, Tj) and Vp = ||j∈J Vp (Tj),
• fuel trading vectors Fp (ti, Tj) = ||l∈L Fp,l (ti, Tj), Fp (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Fp (ti, Tj), and
Fp = ||j∈J Fp (Tj),
• emission trading vectors Op (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Op (ti, Tj) and Op = ||j∈J Op (Tj),
• electricity production vectors Wp,l (Tj) = ||r∈Rp,l Wp,l,r (Tj), Wp (Tj) = ||l∈LWp,l (Tj), and
Wp = ||j∈J Wp (Tj),
and finally vp =
[
V ⊤p , F
⊤
p , O
⊤
p ,W
⊤
p
]⊤
. Similarly, we concatenate all price vectors as
πp =
Π⊤, G⊤, G⊤em, 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
dim(Wp)

⊤
,
where the number of zeros matches the dimension of the vector Wp.
Producer p ∈ P is not able to arbitrarily choose her decision variables since there are some
inequality and equality constraints that limit her feasible set. The change in production of each power
plant from one delivery period to next is limited by the ramp up and ramp down constraints. For each
j ∈ {1, ..., T ′ − 1}, where T ′ denotes the last delivery period, l ∈ L and r ∈ Rp,l these constraints can
be expressed as
(3.1) △W
p,l,r
min ≤Wp,l,r (Tj+1)−Wp,l,r (Tj) ≤ △W
p,l,r
max,
where △W
p,l,r
max and △W
p,l,r
min represent maximum rates for ramping up and down, respectively. The
ramping rates highly depend on the type of the power plant. Some gas power plants can increase
production from zero to the maximum in just a few minutes, while the same action may take days or
weeks for a nuclear power plant.
The capacity constraints for each power plant r ∈ Rp,l can be expressed as
(3.2) 0 ≤Wp,l,r (Tj) ≤W
p,l,r
max,
where W
p,l,r
max denotes the maximum production.
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Additionally, we also bound the the number of electricity contracts that each player is allowed to
trade as
(3.3) −Vtrade ≤ Vp (ti, Tj) ≤ Vtrade
for some large Vtrade > 0. Trading of an infinite number of contracts would clearly lead to a bankruptcy
of one of the counterparties involved and must thus be prevented. In [21] it was shown, that if Vtrade
is chosen to be large enough, then Constraint (3.3) has no impact on the optimal solution and can be
eliminated from the problem.
There are also equality constraints that connect power plant production with electricity, fuel, and
emission trading. For each j ∈ J the electricity sold in the forward and spot market together must
equal the actually produced electricity, i.e.
(3.4) −
∑
i∈Ij
Vp (ti, Tj) =
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
Wp,l,r (Tj) .
Each producer p ∈ P has to make sure that a sufficient amount of fuel l ∈ L has been bought to cover
the electricity production for each delivery period j ∈ J . Such constraint can be expressed as
(3.5)
∑
r∈Rp,l
Wp,l,r (Tj) c
p,l,r =
∑
i∈Ij
Fp,l (ti, Tj)
where cp,l,r > 0 is the efficiency of power plant r ∈ Rp,l.
The carbon emission obligation constraint can be written as
(3.6)
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Ij
O (ti, Tj) =
∑
j∈J
∑
l∈L
∑
r∈Rp,l
Wp,l,r (Tj) g
p,l,r,
where gp,l,r > 0 denotes the carbon emission intensity factor for power plant r ∈ Rp,l. This constraint
ensures that enough emission certificates have been bought to cover the electricity production over the
whole planning horizon.
Any producers’ goal is to maximize their expected profit subject to a risk budget. In this work
we assume that the risk budget is expressed in a mean-variance framework. As mentioned in the
introduction, the main argument that supports this decision is that delta hedging, which is the most
widely used hedging strategy, can be captured in this framework.
The profit Pp (vp, πp) of producer p ∈ P can be calculated as
(3.7) Pp (vp, πp) =
∑
j∈J
e−rˆTj
∑
i∈Ij
P ti,Tjp (vp, πp)

where the profit P
ti,Tj
p (vp, πp) for each i ∈ Ij and j ∈ J can be calculated as
P ti,Tjp (vp, πp) = −Π(ti, Tj)Vp (ti, Tj)−Op (ti, Tj)Gem (ti, Tj)−
∑
l∈L
Gl (ti, Tj)Fp,l (ti, Tj) .
Under a mean-variance optimization framework, producers are interested in the mean-variance utility
Ψp (vp) = E
P [Pp (vp, πp)]−
λp
2 Var
P [Pp (vp, πp)]
= −EP [πp]
⊤
vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p Qpvp,
where λp > 0 is their risk preference parameter and Qp := E
P
[(
πp − E
P [πp]
) (
πp − E
P [πp]
)⊤]
an
“extended” covariance matrix. Their objective is to solve the following optimization problem
(3.8) Φp = max
vp
Ψp (vp)
subject to (3.1), (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6).
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3.2. Consumer. We make the assumption that demand is completely inelastic and that each
consumer c ∈ C is responsible for satisfying a proportion pc ∈ [0, 1] of the total demand D (Tj) at time
Tj, j ∈ J . Since pc is a proportion, we clearly have that
∑
c∈C pc = 1.
A number of electricity forward contracts consumer c ∈ C buys at trading time ti, i ∈ Ij for
delivery at time Tj, j ∈ J is denoted by Vc (ti, Tj). Similarly as for producers, we can simplify the
notation by introducing electricity trading vectors Vc (Tj) = ||i∈Ij Vc (ti, Tj) and Vc = ||j∈J Vc (Tj).
We bound the the number of electricity contracts that each player is allowed to trade as
(3.9) −Vtrade ≤ Vp (ti, Tj) ≤ Vtrade
for some large Vtrade > 0. Trading of an infinite number of contracts would clearly lead to a bankruptcy
of one of the counterparties involved and must thus be prevented. In [21] it was shown, that if Vtrade is
chosen large enough, then Constraint (3.9) has no impact on the optimal solution and can be eliminated
from the problem.
Consumers are responsible for satisfying the electricity demand of end users. The electricity
demand is expected to be satisfied for each Tj, i.e.
(3.10)
∑
i∈Ij
Vc (ti, Tj) = pcD (Tj) .
At the time of calculating the optimal decisions, consumers assume that they know the future realiza-
tion of demand D (Tj) precisely. If the knowledge about the future realization of the demand changes,
then players can take recourse actions by recalculating their optimal decisions with the updated de-
mand forecast. Consumers may assume that they will be able to execute the recourse actions, because
it is the job of the system operator to ensure that a sufficient amount of electricity is available on the
market.
Consumers would like to maximize their profit subject to a risk budget. Similar to the model
we introduced for producers, we assume that the risk budget can be expressed in a mean-variance
framework. The profit of consumer c ∈ C can be calculated as
(3.11) Pc (Vc,Π) =
∑
j∈J
e−rˆTj
∑
i∈Ij
−Π(ti, Tj)Vc (ti, Tj) + scpcD (Tj)
 ,
where rˆ ∈ R denotes a constant interest rate and sc ∈ R denotes a contractually fixed price that
consumer c ∈ C receives for selling the electricity further to end users (e.g. households, businesses
etc.). Note that the contractually fixed price sc only affects the optimal objective value of consumer
c ∈ C, but not also her optimal solution. Since we are primarily interested in optimal solutions, we
simplify the notation and set sc = 0. The correct optimal value can always be calculated via post-
processing when an optimal solution is already known. This may be needed for risk management
purposes.
Under a mean-variance optimization framework consumers are interested in the mean-variance
utility
Ψc (Vc) = E
P [Pc (Vc,Π)]−
λp
2 Var
P [Pc (Vc,Π)]
= −EP [Π]
⊤
Vc −
λ
2V
⊤
c QcVc,
where λc > 0 is their risk preference and Qc := E
P
[(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤]
a covariance matrix.
Their objective is to solve the following optimization problem
(3.12) Φc = max
Vc
Ψc (Vc)
subject to (3.9) and (3.10).
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3.3. Matrix notation. The analysis of the problem is greatly simplified if a more compact
notation is introduced.
Equality constraints of producer p ∈ P can be expressed as
Apvp = 0
and inequality constraints as
Bpvp ≤ bp
for some Ap ∈ R
|J|(|L|+1)+1×dim vp , Bp ∈ R
np×dim vp and bp ∈ R
np , where np denotes the number of
the inequality constraints of producer p ∈ P . Define a feasible set
Sp := {vp : Apvp = ap and Bpvp ≤ bp} .
It is useful to investigate the inner structure of the matrices. By considering equality constraints (3.4),
(3.5), and (3.6) we can see that
(3.13) Ap =
[
Aˆ1 0 Aˆ3,p
0 Aˆ2 Aˆ4,p
]
where Aˆ1 ∈ R
|J|×N , Aˆ2 ∈ R
(|J||L|+1)×N(|L|+1), Aˆ3,p ∈ R
|J|×dimWp , Aˆ4,p ∈ R
(|J||L|+1)×dimWp . One can
see that matrices Aˆ1 and Aˆ2 are independent of producer p ∈ P and matrices Aˆ3,p and Aˆ4,p depend
on producer p ∈ P . One can further investigate the structure of Aˆ1 and see
(3.14) Aˆ1 =
 11 0. . .
0 1|J|
 ,
where 1j, j ∈ J is a row vector of ones of length |Ij |. Similarly,
(3.15) Aˆ2 =

Aˆ1 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 · · · Aˆ1 0
0 · · · 0 1|N |
 ,
where the number of rows in the block notation above is |L|+1. The first |L| rows correspond to (3.5)
and the last row corresponds to (3.6).
The profit of producer p ∈ P can be written as
Pp (vp, πp) = −π
⊤
p vp.
In a compact notation, the mean-variance utility of producer p ∈ P can be calculated as
Ψp
(
vp,E
P [Π]
)
= EP
[
−π⊤p vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p
(
πp − E
P [πp]
) (
πp − E
P [πp]
)⊤
vp
]
= −EP [πp]
⊤
vp −
1
2λpv
⊤
p Qpvp,
where
(3.16) Qp := E
P
[(
πp − E
P [πp]
) (
πp − E
P [πp]
)⊤]
.
The inner structure of matrix Qp is the following
(3.17) Qp =
 Qˆ1 Qˆ2 0Qˆ⊤2 Qˆ3 0
0 0 0

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where Qˆ1 ∈ R
N×N , Qˆ2 ∈ R
N×(dimBp+dimOp) = RN×N(|L|+1), Qˆ3 ∈ R
N(|L|+1)×N(|L|+1). One can see
that Qˆ1, Qˆ2, and Qˆ3 do not depend on producer p ∈ P . The size of the larger matrix Qp depends on
producer p ∈ P , because different producers have different number of power plants.
Producer p ∈ P attempts to solve the following optimization problem
Φp
(
E
P [Π]
)
= max
vp∈Sp
− EP [πp]
⊤
vp −
1
2
λpv
⊤
p Qpvp.
The equality constraints of consumer c ∈ C can be expressed as
AcVc = ac
and the inequality constraints as
BcVc ≤ bc
where Ac = Aˆ1, Bc ∈ R
2N×N , ac ∈ R
|J| and bc ∈ R
2N . Define a feasible set
Sc :=
{
Vc ∈ R
N : AcVc = ac and BcVc ≤ bc
}
.
The profit of consumer c ∈ C can be written as
Pc (Vc,Π) = −Π
⊤Vc.
In a compact notation, the mean-variance utility of a consumer c ∈ C can be calculated as
Ψc
(
Vc,E
P [Π]
)
= EP
[
−Π⊤Vc −
1
2λcV
⊤
c
(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤
Vc
]
= −EP [Π]
⊤
Vc −
λ
2V
⊤
c QcVc,
where
(3.18) Qc := E
P
[(
Π− EP [Π]
) (
Π− EP [Π]
)⊤]
.
Moreover, note that Qc = Qˆ1 for all c ∈ C. We set sc = 0, w.l.o.g. Consumer c ∈ C attempts to solve
the following optimization problem
Φc
(
E
P [Π]
)
= max
Vc∈Sc
− EP [Π]
⊤
Vc −
λ
2
V ⊤c QcVc.
3.4. The hypothetical market agent. Given the price vectors of electricity Π, fuel G, and
emissions Gem, each producer p ∈ P and each consumer c ∈ C can calculate their optimal electricity
trading vectors Vp and Vc by solving (3.8) and (3.12), respectively. However, the players are not
necessary able to execute their calculated optimal trading strategies because they may not find the
counterparty to trade with. In reality each contract consists of a buyer and a seller, which imposes
an additional constraint (also called the market clearing constraint) that matches the number of short
and long electricity contracts for each i ∈ Ij and j ∈ J as follows,
(3.19)
∑
c∈C
Vc (ti, Tj) +
∑
p∈P
Vp (ti, Tj) = 0.
The electricity market is responsible for satisfying this constraint by matching buyers with sellers.
The matching is done through sharing of the price and order book information among all market
participants. If at the current price there are more long contract than short contracts, it means that
the current price is too low and asks will start to be submitted at higher prices. The converse occurs,
if there are more short contracts than long contracts. Eventually, the electricity price at which the
number of long and short contracts matches is found. At such a price the constraint (3.19) is satisfied
“naturally” without explicitly requiring the players to satisfy it. They do so because it is in their best
interest, i.e. it maximizes their mean-variance objective functions.
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The question is how to formulate such an equilibrium constraint in an optimization framework. A
naive approach of writing the market clearing constraint as an ordinary constraint forces the players to
satisfy it regardless of the price. We need a mechanism that models the matching of buyers and sellers
as it is performed by the electricity market. For this purpose, we introduce a hypothetical market
agent who is allowed to slowly change electricity prices to ensure that (3.19) is satisfied.
Let the hypothetical market agent have the following profit function
(3.20)
PM (Π, V ) =
∑
j∈J e
−rˆTj
[∑
i∈Ij
Π(ti, Tj)
(∑
c∈C Vc (ti, Tj) +
∑
p∈P Vp (ti, Tj)
)]
= EP [Π]⊤
(∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp
)
and the expected profit
(3.21) ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
= EP [PM (V,Π)] ,
where V =
[
V ⊤P , V
⊤
C
]⊤
, VP = ||p∈P Vp, and VC = ||c∈C Vc and let the hypothetical market agent
attempts to solve
(3.22) ΦM (V ) = max
EP[Π]
ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
.
The KKT conditions for (3.22) in the matrix notation read
(3.23)
∑
c∈C
Vc +
∑
p∈P
Vp = 0,
which is exactly the same as (3.19). Note, that the equivalence of (3.19) and (3.22) is a theoretical result
that has to be applied with caution in an algorithmic framework. Formulation (3.22) is clearly unstable
since only a small mismatch in the market clearing constraint sends the prices to ±∞. Thus, a stable
formulation of the hypothetical market agent must be found. Let us now analyze the hypothetical
market agent with the following, slightly altered, optimization problem
(3.24)
max
EP[Π]
ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , V
)
s.t.
∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp = 0
µM = 0,
where µM denotes the dual variables of the equality constraint in (3.24). It is trivial to check that the
optimality conditions for (3.24) correspond to (3.19). Formulation (3.24) is clearly stable, because the
market clearing constraint is satisfied precisely. The equality constraint on the dual variables makes
sure that the optimal solution remains the same if the market clearing constraint is removed after
the calculation of the optimal solution. Formulation (3.24) is used as a definition of the hypothetical
market agent in the rest of this work.
We can see that, by affecting the expected electricity price, the hypothetical agent changes the
electricity price process. It is not immediately clear how to construct such a stochastic process or
that such a stochastic process exists at all. We refer the reader to [21], where a constructive proof of
the existence is given. The proof is based on the Doob decomposition theorem, where we allow the
hypothetical market agent to control an integrable predictable term of the process, while keeping the
martingale term of the process intact.
For the further argumentation we define vP = ||p∈P vp and v =
[
v⊤P , V
⊤
C
]⊤
.
3.5. Nash equilibrium. We are interested in finding a Nash equilibrium defined as
Definition 3.1. Nash Equilibrium (NE)
Decisions v∗ and EP [Π]
∗
constitute a Nash equilibrium if
1. For every producer p ∈ P , v∗p is a strategy such that
(3.25) Ψp
(
vp,E
P [Π]
∗)
≤ Ψp
(
v∗p,E
P [Π]
∗)
for all vp ∈ Sp;
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2. For every consumer c ∈ C, V ∗c is a strategy such that
(3.26) Ψc
(
Vc,E
P [Π]∗
)
≤ Ψc
(
V ∗c ,E
P [Π]∗
)
for all Vc ∈ Sc;
3. Price vector EP [Π]
∗
maximizes the objective function of the hypothetical market agent, i.e.
(3.27) ΨM
(
E
P [Π] , v∗
)
≤ ΨM
(
E
P [Π]
∗
, v∗
)
for all EP [Π] ∈ SM .
From Definition (3.1), it is not clear whether a NE for our problem exists and whether it is unique.
This problem was thoroughly investigated in [21]. Roughly speaking, it was shown that if the demand
of the end users can be covered by the available system of power plants, then a NE exists. Moreover,
if the power plants are similar enough (if there are no big gaps in the efficiency of the power plants),
then one can show that the NE is also unique. On the other hand, if power plants are similar enough,
then the expected equilibrium price of each electricity contract might be an interval instead of a single
point.
In this paper we focus on the numerical calculation of the NE under the assumption of the existence
of solution. For this paper, we assume the following a slightly stricter condition.
Assumption 3.2. For all p ∈ P , the exists vector vp such that Apvp = ap a.s. and Bpvp < bp
a.s., for all c ∈ C, there exists vector Vc such that AcVc = ac a.s. and BcVc < bc a.s., and the vectors
Vp and Vc can be chosen so that (3.23) is satisfied.
4. Quadratic programming formulation. The traditional approach to solving equilibrium
optimization problems is through shadow prices (see [13] for example). However, this approach is only
valid when no inequality constraints are present. Shadow prices depend on the set of active constraints
and thus one can only use this approach when the active set is known. In inequality constrainted
optimization, the active set is usually not know in advance and thus a different approach is needed.
The proposed formulation below can be seen as an extension of the shadow price concept to inequality
constrained optimization problems.
A naive approach for solving inequality constrained equilibrium optimization problem would be to
choose an expected price vector EP [Π] and then calculate optimal solutions for each producer p ∈ P
and each consumer c ∈ C. If at such price
∥∥∥∑c∈C Vc +∑p∈P Vp∥∥∥ is close to zero, then the solution is
found and EP [Π] is an equilibrium expected price vector. Otherwise, we have to adjust the expected
price vector and repeat the procedure. We can see that such an algorithm is costly, because it requires
to solve a large optimization problem (i.e. to calculate the optimal solutions of each producer and each
consumer) multiple times. In the section below, we show that we can do much better than the naive
approach. Using the reformulation we propose, the large optimization problem must be solved only
once.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for all vk, k ∈ P ∪ C and E
P [Π] to constitute a NE are the
following, due to the fact that Assumption 3.2 implies the Slater condition,
(4.1)
−EP [πk]
⊤
− λkQkvk −B
⊤
k ηk −A
⊤
k µk = 0
η⊤k (Bkvk − bk) = 0
Bkvk − bk ≤ 0
Akvk − ak = 0
ηk ≥ 0∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp = 0.
The last equation corresponds to the KKT conditions of the hypothetical market agent.
We can now interpret (4.1) as the KKT conditions of one large optimization problem that includes
the new definition (3.24) of the hypothetical market agent. To see this, we join all decision variables
into one vector x :=
[
v⊤,EP [Π]
⊤
]⊤
and rewrite
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• the equality constraints as Ax = a with a :=
a⊤p1 , ..., a⊤pP , a⊤c1 , ..., a⊤cC , 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
⊤where the
number of ending zeros is equal to N , and
A :=

Ap1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 ApP 0 0
0 Ac1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 AcC 0
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0

,
where Mp ∈ R
N × Rdim vp is a matrix defined as
Mp =
diag
1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
N

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0
 ,
• the inequality constraints as Bx ≤ b with b :=
[
b⊤p1 , ..., b
⊤
pP
, b⊤c1 , ..., b
⊤
cC
]⊤
, and
B :=

Bp1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 BpP 0 0
0 Bc1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 BcC 0

,
• the objective function as −π⊤x − 12x
⊤Qx with π :=
EP [π0,p1 ]⊤ , ...,EP [π0,pP ]⊤ , 0, ..., 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(|C|+1)N

⊤
where π0,p is πp with elements of Π set to zero, and
(4.2) Q :=

λp1Qp1 0 M
⊤
p1
0
. . . 0
...
0 λpPQpP 0 M
⊤
pP
0 λc1Qc1 0 I
0
. . . 0
...
0 λcCQcC I
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0

,
• the dual variables as η :=
[
η⊤p1 , ..., η
⊤
pP
, η⊤c1 , ..., η
⊤
cC
]
and µ :=
[
µ⊤p1 , ..., µ
⊤
pP
, µ⊤c1 , ..., µ
⊤
cC
, µ⊤M
]
.
Lemma 4.1. Q  0 for all x that satisfy the market clearing constraint, i.e.
∑
p∈P Vp+
∑
c∈C Vc =
0.
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Proof. We have
x⊤Qx = v⊤

λp1Qp1 0
0
. . . 0
0 λpPQpP 0
0 λc1Qc1 0
0
. . . 0
0 λcCQcC

v
+2EP [Π]
⊤
(∑
c∈C Vc +
∑
p∈P Vp
)
=
∑
p∈P λpv
⊤
p Qpvp +
∑
c∈C λcv
⊤
c Qcvc
≥ 0,
since λp > 0, λc > 0, Qc ≻ 0, Qp  0 for all p ∈ P and c ∈ C.
In this setting we can reformulate the KKT conditions (4.1) as follows,
(4.3)
−π −Qx−B⊤η −A⊤µ = 0
η⊤ (Bx − b) = 0
Bx− b ≤ 0
Ax − a = 0
η ≥ 0
µM = 0.
Proposition 4.2. The KKT conditions (4.3) are equivalent to the KKT conditions (4.1).
Proof. We will consider each equation separately. Let us start with Ax − a = 0. Writing the
equation in matrix form
Ap1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 ApP 0 0
0 Ac1 0 0
0
. . . 0
...
0 AcC 0
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0


vp1
...
vpP
vc1
...
vcC
E
P [Π]

−

ap1
...
apP
ac1
...
acC
0

=

0
...
0
0
...
0
0

leads to 
Ap1vp1
...
ApP vpP
Ac1vc1
...
AcCvcC∑
p∈P Vp +
∑
c∈C Vc

−

ap1
...
apP
ac1
...
acC
0

=

0
...
0
0
...
0
0

,
as required.
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We continue with the expression −π − Qx − B⊤η − A⊤µ = 0. We first focus on −π − Qx only.
Writing the equation in matrix form
−

E
P [π0,p1 ]
...
E
P [π0,pP ]
0
...
0
0

−

λp1Qp1 0 M
⊤
p1
0
. . . 0
...
0 λpPQpP 0 M
⊤
pP
0 λc1Qc1 0 I
0
. . . 0
...
0 λcCQcC I
Mp1 · · · MpP I · · · I 0


vp1
...
vpP
vc1
...
vcC
E
P [Π]

= −

E
P [π0,p1 ]
...
E
P [π0,pP ]
0
...
0
0

−

λp1Qp1vp1 +M
⊤
p1
E
P [Π]
...
λpPQpP vpP +M
⊤
pP
E
P [Π]
λc1Qc1vc1 + E
P [Π]
...
λcCQcCvcC + E
P [Π]∑
p∈P Vp +
∑
c∈C Vc

,
and noting that −EP [π0,p]−M
⊤
p E
P [Π] = −EP [πp] for all p ∈ P , this leads to
−π −Qx = −

λp1Qp1vp1 + E
P [πp1 ]
...
λpPQpP vpP + E
P [πpP ]
λc1Qc1vc1 + E
P [Π]
...
λcCQcCvcC + E
P [Π]∑
p∈P Vp +
∑
c∈C Vc

.
Similarly, writing the remainder −B⊤η −A⊤µ in matrix form leads to
−

B⊤p1 0
0
. . . 0
0 B⊤pP 0
0 B⊤c1 0
0
. . . 0
0 B⊤cC
0 0 0 0


ηp1
...
ηpP
ηc1
...
ηcC

= −

B⊤p1ηp1
...
B⊤pP ηpP
B⊤c1ηc1
...
B⊤cCηcC
0

and
−

A⊤p1 0 M
⊤
p
0
. . . 0
...
0 A⊤pP 0 M
⊤
p
0 A⊤c1 0 I
0
. . . 0
...
0 A⊤cC I
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0


µp1
...
µpP
µc1
...
µcC
µM

= −

A⊤p1µp1
...
A⊤pP µpP
A⊤c1µc1
...
A⊤cCµcC
0

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where µM = 0 was used. Writing it all together
−

λp1Qp1vp1 + E
P [πp1 ]
...
λpPQpP vpP + E
P [πpP ]
λc1QCvc1 + E
P [Π]
...
λcCQCvcC + E
P [Π]∑
p∈P Vp +
∑
c∈C Vc

−

B⊤p1ηp1
...
B⊤pP ηpP
B⊤c1ηc1
...
B⊤cCηcC
0

−

A⊤p1µp1
...
A⊤pP µpP
A⊤c1µc1
...
A⊤cCµcC
0

=

0
...
0
0
...
0
0

gives the required conditions.
The proofs for η⊤ (Bx− b) = 0, Bx− b ≤ 0, and η ≥ 0 are trivial.
Since the additional constraints µM = 0 on the dual variables of Problem 4.3 cannot be handled
by most of the available quadratic programming solvers, we have to reformulate the problem in a dual
form. We start by formulating the optimization problem out of the KKT conditions (4.3) as
(4.4)
max
x
−π⊤x− 12x
⊤Qx
s.t. Ax = a
Bx ≤ b
µM = 0
and by defining the Lagrangian as
L (x, µ, η) =
 −
1
2x
⊤Qx− π⊤x− (Ax − a)
⊤
µ− (Bx− b)
⊤
η; if η ≥ 0
−∞; otherwise.
By the virtue of Lemma 4.1, Q  0, and L (x, µ, η) is therefore a smooth and convex function. The
unconstrained minimizer can be determined by solving DxL (x, µ, η) = 0. Calculating
DxL (x, µ, η) = −Qx− π −A
⊤µ− B⊤η
and inserting π back to the Lagrangian, an equivalent formulation is obtained as follows,
L (x, µ, η) =

1
2x
⊤Qx+ a⊤µ+ b⊤η if η ≥ 0 and −Qx− π −A⊤µ−B⊤η = 0,
−∞ otherwise
Relating the latter to a maximization optimization problem, the following formulation is obtained
(4.5)
max
x,µ,η
− 12x
⊤Qx− µ⊤a− η⊤b
s.t. Qx+A⊤µ+B⊤λ+ π = 0
η ≥ 0
µM = 0.
Problem (4.5) is equivalent to Problem (4.4), but it can be solved using any quadratic programming
algorithm. The numerical results in this paper are calculated using Gurobi [14].
5. Extensions of the model. In this section we describe a few realistic extensions of the model
from Section 3, that are needed to make the model applicable in practice. Note that all extensions can
be incorporated into the quadratic programming framework, and thus the reformulation of Section 4
still applies.
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5.1. Future contracts. In the model above, we assumed that the market participants trade only
forward contracts. A more realistic market setting would include also future contracts. In this section
we explain how the model can be extended in this regard.
Let Π´ and Π` denote prices of forward and future contracts, respectively. A no-arbitrage argument
allows one to calculate EP
[
Π`
]
as a solution of the following triangular system of linear equations for
each j ∈ J ,
(5.1)
E
P
[
Π´ (ti, Tj)
]
=

E
P
[
Π` (ti, Tj)
]
i = max {Ij}
E
P
[
Π` (ti, Tj)
]
+
∑max{Ij}−1
k=i
([
E
P
[
Π` (tk+1, Tj)
]
− EP
[
Π` (tk, Tj)
]]
e
−rtk+1
e
−rTj
)
i < max {Ij} .
Recall from the introduction that tmax{Ij} = Tj.
5.2. Tradable contracts. In the previous sections, we have implicitly assumed that each con-
tract covers only one delivery period. As described in Subsection 2, this is clearly not true in reality
where contracts often cover a longer delivery period. For example, season ahead contracts cover the
delivery over every half hour in the next season. Similarly, a month ahead contract covers every half
hour in the next month. One can also distinguish between peak contracts which cover only delivery
periods from 7am to 7pm and off-peak contracts which cover delivery periods from 7pm to 7am. Other
blocks are also possible.
A contract that covers many delivery periods J ′ ⊆ J and is traded at ti, i ∈ ∩j′∈J′Ij′ can be
incorporated in our model by enforcing
(5.2) EP [Π (ti, Tj′)] = E
P [Π (ti, Tj′′)]
and
(5.3) Vk (ti, Tj′) = Vk (ti, Tj′′)
for all k ∈ P ∪C and all j′, j′′ ∈ J ′.
5.3. Costs of trading. In the previous sections we assumed that the players can change their
position without paying any fees. The reality is of course different. Cost of trading is an important
component involved in the trading of power. The precise formulation of the trading costs depends on
the market micro-structure and it is a research area itself. In this paper we adapt the view of [1] where
they propose that a cost of trading one unit of power can be approximated by a linear function
(5.4) h (Vp (ti, Tj)) = ǫij sign (Vp (ti, Tj)) + υijVp (ti, Tj) .
The first term represents the fixed costs of trading that occur due to the bid-ask spread and trading
fees. A good estimate for ǫij is the sum of a half of the bid-offer spread and the trading fees. The second
term approximates the micro-structure of the order book. Selling a large volume Vp (ti, Tj) exhausts
the supply of liquidity, which causes a short-term decrease in the price. The factor υij hence represents
a half of the change in price caused by selling volume Vp (ti, Tj). We assume that the decrease in price
is only temporary and that the price returns the equilibrium level at the next trading time ti+1.
Equation (5.4) represents costs of trading a unit of power. Costs of trading a volume Vp (ti, Tj) is
then
(5.5) Vp (ti, Tj)h (Vp (ti, Tj)) = ǫij |Vp (ti, Tj)|+ υijVp (ti, Tj)
2
.
See Subsection 2 for a discussion of the bid-ask spread in the UK electricity market.
6. Numerical results. In this section we describe numerical results. First we investigate the
calibration of power plant parameters from the historical production. Then we discuss the properties
of the term structure of electricity with the help of a simple artificial example. Finally, the suitability
of our model for realistically modeling the entire UK electricity market is presented.
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6.1. Calibration. If our model is applied in practice, one has to estimate the physical character-
istics of the power plants such as capacity, ramp up and ramp down constraints, efficiency, and carbon
emission intensity factor.
In the UK all power plants are required to submit their available capacity as well as ramp up and
ramp down constraints to the system operator on a half hourly basis. This data is publicly available
at the Elexon website7.
A more challenging problem is to estimate the efficiency and the carbon emission intensity factor
of each power plant. As we explained in Section 2, all market participants submit their expected
production/consumption to the system operator one hour before the delivery. Our goal is to find the
efficiency and the carbon emission intensity factor that best describe the historical production of each
power plant.
We first normalized the historical production of each power plant by calculating the ratio between
the production and the available capacity of a power plant in each half hour. We denote the normalized
historical production by W˜p,l,r (Tj) for each delivery period j ∈ J and power plant r ∈ R
p,l. Normal-
ization makes sure that W˜p,l,r (Tj) ∈ [0, 1]. For the purpose of calibration we assume that producers
are risk neutral and set λp = 0 for all p ∈ P . Furthermore, we neglect the ramp up and ramp down
constraints (3.1). With these simplifications, we can see that a power plant will produce at time Tj
if and only if the income from selling electricity at the spot price is greater or equal to the costs of
purchasing the required fuel and emission certificates at the current spot price. In other words, for a
power plant that runs on fuel l ∈ L and produces electricity at time Tj ,
(6.1) Π(Tj, Tj)− c
p,l,rGl (Tj , Tj)− g
p,l,rGem (Tj , Tj) ≥ 0
must hold for production to take place.
It is immediately clear why (6.1) must hold when only spot contracts are available. Let us inves-
tigate why (6.1) holds also if forward and future electricity contracts are available on the market. At
any trading time ti, i ∈ Ij , a rational producer could enter into a short electricity forward contract
and simultaneously into a long fuel and emission forward contract if
(6.2) Π(ti, Tj)− c
p,l,rGl (ti, Tj)− g
p,l,rGem (ti, Tj) ≥ 0.
At delivery time Tj , this producer has two options:
• To acquire the delivery of the fuel and emission certificates bought at trading time ti and
produce electricity. In this case, she observes the following profit
(6.3) P̂1 (Tj) = Π (ti, Tj)− c
p,l,rGl (ti, Tj)− g
p,l,rGem (ti, Tj) .
• To produce no electricity and instead close the forward electricity, fuel, and emission contracts.
In this case, she observes the following profit
(6.4)
P̂2 (Tj) = [Π (ti, Tj)−Π(Tj , Tj)]− c
p,l,r [Gl (ti, Tj)−Gl (Tj , Tj)]
−gp,l,r [Gem (ti, Tj)−Gem (Tj , Tj)] .
Power plant r ∈ Rp,l will run at Tj if and only if
(6.5) P̂1 (Tj) ≥ P̂2 (Tj) .
With some reordering of the terms, it is easy to see that inequality (6.5) is equivalent to inequality
(6.1).
To adjust inequality (6.1) for the neglected risk premium and trading costs, we add another term
c˜p,l,r ≥ 0 and then (6.1) reads
(6.6) Θ
(
cp,l,r, gp,l,r, c˜p,l,r;Tj
)
≥ 0,
where
(6.7) Θ
(
cp,l,r, gp,l,r, c˜p,l,r;Tj
)
= Π(Tj , Tj)− c
p,l,rGl (Tj, Tj)− g
p,l,rGem (Tj, Tj)− c˜
p,l,r.
7http://www.bmreports.com/
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Figure 6.1. υij = 0, ǫij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, and increasing λk for all k ∈ P ∪ C. The trading
periods named by a number from 1 to 5 correspond to a two months ahead, a month ahead, a week ahead, a day ahead,
and the spot price, respectively.
In last step of the calibration, we use Θ
(
cp,l,r, gp,l,r, c˜p,l,r;Tj
)
in the logistic regression. The
efficiency cp,l,r and carbon emission intensity factor gp,l,r that best explain the historical production
of power plant r ∈ Rp,l are found as an optimal solution to
(6.8) min
cp,l,r,gp,l,r ,c˜p,l,r
∑
j∈J
(
W˜p,l,r (Tj)−
1
1 + exp (−Θ(cp,l,r, gp,l,r, c˜p,l,r;Tj))
)2
.
For each power plant we used over 5000 training samples obtained from the period between 1/1/2012
and 1/1/2013.
6.2. Term structure of the price. In this subsection we study the term structure of the
electricity price. We focus on a simple problem with only one delivery period and five trading periods.
The trading periods named by a number from 1 to 5 correspond to a two months ahead, a month
ahead, a week ahead, a day ahead, and the spot price, respectively. To keep the effects of various
parameters of the model on the term structure of the electricity price clearly visible, we set the risk
free interest rate rˆ to zero.
Figure 6.1 shows how the term structure of the electricity price and the number of contracts
traded depends on the risk aversion of the players involved. We can see that the market is usually in
normal backwardation (i.e. the term structure is upward sloping) and that the slope as well as the
price increases when the risk aversion of the players increases. This increase in the price is due to the
increased risk premium of the producers. The risk premium for risky contracts is higher than the risk
premium of less risky contracts.
In Figure 6.2 we study the case when only the risk aversion of the producers is increased while the
risk aversion of the consumers is kept constant. As we can see the risk aversion of the producers does
not have any significant impact on the shape of the term structure of the price. However, the price of
all contracts increased significantly due to the increased risk premium of the producers.
In Figure 6.3 we study the case when only the risk aversion of the consumers is increased while
the risk aversion of the producers is kept constant. We can see that this has a small impact on the
term structure of the price. In contrast to the producers, the increased risk premium of the consumers
is not reflected in an increased price. Thus, the consumers can only maintain their profitability by
increasing the fixed price they charge the end users (i.e. they increase the constant price sc defined in
(3.11)).
One must increase the consumers’ risk aversion parameter λc significantly to observe a visual
impact. Such hypothetical case is depicted in Figure 6.4. We can see that by increasing the risk
aversion of consumers, the term structure of electricity prices changes from the normal backwardation
to contango. An increased risk aversion increases the consumers’ interest in less risky contracts and
decreases the interest in risky contracts. Since the contracts closer to delivery are usually more risky,
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Figure 6.2. υij = 0, ǫij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, λc = 10−6 for all c ∈ C, and increasing λp for all
p ∈ P .
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Figure 6.3. υij = 0, ǫij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, λp = 10−6 for all p ∈ P , and increasing λc for all
c ∈ C.
this causes the term structure to flip from normal backwardation to contango. A small kink at the
fourth trading period is a consequence of a calibration of the covariance matrix on historical values.
Intuitively, it may not be immediately clear why the change in the risk aversion of producers and
consumers has such a different impact on the term structure of the electricity price. The level of the
price is defined by producers only. Let us consider a simplified setting when there is only one trading
period and only one delivery period. Moreover, we have just one producer and one consumer. In such
a setting, the profit of the consumer can be calculated as
(6.9) Pc (Vc,Π) = e
−rˆT1 (−Π(t1, T1) + sc)D (T1)
where the constraint Vc (t1, T1) = D (T1) was used. We can see that the profit function does not depend
on the consumer’s decision variables Vc. Thus the consumer does not have any power to influence the
price. She has to buy a sufficient amount of electricity to satisfy the demand of end users regardless
of the electricity price. On the other hand, the producer has much more flexibility. Her profit can be
calculated as
(6.10)
Pp (Vp,Π) = e
−rˆT1
[
−Π(t1, T1)Vp (t1, T1)−Op (t1, T1)Gem (t1, T1)−
∑
l∈L
Gl (t1, T1)Fp,l (t1, T1)
]
.
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Figure 6.4. υij = 0, ǫij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, λp = 10−6 for all p ∈ P , and increasing λc for all
c ∈ C.
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Figure 6.5. λk = 10
−6 for all k ∈ P ∪C, ǫij = 0 and increasing υij for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}.
An obvious feasible solution to her optimization problem (3.8) is
(6.11) Vp (t1, T1) = Op (t1, T1) = Fp,l (t1, T1) = 0
for all l ∈ L. This leads to the objective value Φp = 0. Thus, clearly for any given price Π(t1, T1), the
objective value satisfies Φp ≥ 0. A producer will only turn on the power plants if the electricity price
is high enough to cover all production costs, trading costs, and the risk premium. A similar reasoning
can also be extended to a multiperiod setting.
In Figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 we study the impact of the liquidity on the term structure of the
electricity price. In Figures 6.5, and 6.6 the impact of the market micro-structure (i.e. the quadratic
term υ) is examined while in Figures 6.7, and 6.8 the impact of the bid-ask spread and the trading
fees (i.e. the linear term ǫ) is depicted.
Increasing of υ for all the contracts simultaneously (see Figure 6.5), increases the price without
changing the shape of the term structure. It has a large impact on the optimal trading strategy of the
players. When υ is large players spread the number of contracts traded in each trading period equally
among all the trading periods available.
When υ is changed only for the first trading period (i.e. the two month ahead contract), this
significantly changes the term structure of the price. As we can see in Figure 6.6, a large increase in
υ changes the term structure from normal backwardation to contango (i.e. downward sloping). As
expected, the players also trade a much smaller number of contracts in the first trading period.
An effect of a simultaneous change in the linear trading costs ǫ for all the contracts is depicted in
Figure 6.7. We can see that the linear trading costs have no impact on the trading strategy and on the
19
1 2 3 4 5
40.42
40.43
40.44
40.45
40.46
40.47
40.48
Trading period
Pr
ic
e
 
 
υ=0
υ=10−6
υ=10−5
υ=10−4
υ=10−3
1 2 3 4 5
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 104
Trading period
N
um
be
r o
f c
on
tra
ct
s 
tra
de
d
 
 
υ=0
υ=10−6
υ=10−5
υ=10−4
υ=10−3
Figure 6.6. ǫij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, λk = 10
−6 for all k ∈ P ∪ C, and increasing υ11. For the
other trading periods i ∈ {2, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, υij = 0.
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Figure 6.7. λk = 10
−6 for all k ∈ P ∪C, υij = 0 and increasing ǫij for all i ∈ {1, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}.
shape of the term structure. However, the price of all contracts is increased to cover the losses of the
producers caused by the increased linear cost of trading. The consumers cover the losses caused by
the increased linear cost of trading through increased electricity prices they charge to the end users.
The simultaneous change in the linear trading costs ǫ for all the contracts does not impact the optimal
trading strategy of the players.
When ǫ is changed only for the first trading period (i.e. the two month ahead contract), this,
in contrast to the changes in υ, significantly affects only the price in the first trading period. The
price of the two month ahead contract is increased to cover the losses of the producers caused by the
increased linear cost of trading. If ǫ is increased significantly, this makes the two month ahead contract
so unattractive that no contracts are traded (see the right part of Figure 6.8).
In the reminder of this section, we investigate the effect of the term structure of fuel and emission
prices on the term structure of electricity prices. Initially, we set
(6.12)
E
P [G1 (t1, T1)] = E
P [G1 (t2, T1)] = . . . = E
P [G1 (t5, T1)] = 69.30 [GBp/therm] ,
E
P [G2 (t1, T1)] = E
P [G2 (t2, T1)] = . . . = E
P [G2 (t5, T1)] = 57.87 [GBP/tonne] ,
E
P [Gem (t1, T1)] = E
P [Gem (t2, T1)] = . . . = E
P [Gem (t5, T1)] = 3.883 [GBP/tonne] ,
where l = 1 and l = 2 denote gas and coal prices, respectively. Electricity price is quoted in GBP/MWh.
We conducted two types of experiments: In the first type, we performed parallel shifts of the term
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Figure 6.8. υij = 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., 5} and j ∈ {1}, λk = 10
−6 for all k ∈ P ∪ C, and increasing ǫ11. For the
other trading periods i ∈ {2, ...,5} and j ∈ {1}, ǫij = 0.
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Figure 6.9. Effect of parallel shifts in the term structure of gas prices (right) on the term structure of electricity
prices (left).
structure of fuel/emission prices. In the second type, we changed the shape of the term structure of
fuel/emission prices. Since results for all fuels as well as for emissions are very similar, we present
them for gas only.
Figure 6.9 depicts the effect of parallel shifts in the term structure of gas prices. Expectedly, an
increase/decrease in gas prices causes an increase/decrease in electricity prices.
More interesting is the second experiment, where we calculated the term structure of electricity
prices for three different shapes of the term structure of gas prices. In Figure 6.10, we examined a
constant term structure of gas prices, normal backwardation and contango. We can see that the term
structure of gas/emission prices has a large impact on the term structure of electricity prices.
6.3. The UK power system. In this subsection we apply our model to the entire system of
the UK power plants. We focus on the coal, gas, and oil power plants, because these power plants
adapt their production to cover the changes in demand and are thus responsible for setting the price.
Nuclear power plants do not have to be modeled explicitly because their ramp up and ramp down
constraints are so tight that their production is almost constant over time. They usually deviate from
the maximum production only for maintenance reasons. Renewable sources and interconnectors are
not modeled explicitly, because they require a different treatment not covered in this paper. In this
subsection, we define demand D (Tj) for all j ∈ J as
(6.13) D (Tj) := Dact (Tj)− Prenw (Tj)− Pinter (Tj)
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Figure 6.10. Dependence of the term structure of electricity prices (left) on the shape of the term structure of
gas prices (right).
whereDact (Tj) denotes the actual demand in the UK power system, Prenw (Tj) denotes the production
from all renewable sources including wind, solar, biomass, hydro and pumped storage, and Pinter (Tj)
denotes the inflow of power in to the UK power system through interconnectors. To make this model
useful in practice one has to model each of these terms, but this exceeds the scope of this paper.
We calibrate the model and for each power plant r ∈ Rp,l, l ∈ L and p ∈ P , we estimate the
efficiency cp,l,r, the carbon emission intensity factor gp,l,r, the maximum capacity W
p,l,r
max, the ramp
up rate △W
p,l,r
max and the ramp down rate △W
p,l,r
min using the historical production as described in
Subsection 6.1. The covariance matrix was also estimated from the historical data using the shrinkage
approach described in [17].
Our goal is to calculate the electricity spot price with the information available on 11/2/2013. We
are interested in a delivery period from 4/4/2013 00:00:00 to 8/4/2013 00:00:00. We assume that there
are two types of power contract available. The first is a month ahead contract traded on 15/3/2013
17:00:00 and covers the delivery over all four days. The second type is a spot contract that requires
an immediate delivery and is traded for each half hour separately. We use future prices of coal, gas,
and oil as available on 11/2/2013. Since the historical demand forecast is not available, we used the
realized demand instead, which is a standard practice in the literature. To use this model in practice,
one could use a demand forecast available at the Elexon web page or develop a new approach. Since
we do not have the information about the ownership of the power plants, we assumed that there is
only one producer who owns all power plants connected to the UK grid and only one consumer that
is responsible for satisfying the demand of the end users. In reality, market participants have more
information about the ownership that can be incorporated into the model.
The numerical results in Figures 6.11 - 6.14 are all calculated using λk = 10
−5 for all k ∈ P ∪ C,
and ǫij = 0.1 and υij = 10
−4 for all contracts. The figure on the left hand side depicts the calculated
energy mix between coal and gas power plants, while the figure on the right hand side depicts the
actually observed energy mix. Both figures contain also the spot price calculated by our model and
the actually observed spot price.
Figure 6.11 shows that our model predicts the energy mix very closely. Moreover, the daily pattern
of the electricity price predicted by our model is similar to the actually observed one.
Figure 6.12 shows how the results change when we tighten the ramp up and ramp down constraints
by 20%. We can see that the price is more serrated and slightly higher, because more expensive power
plants must be turned on to cover the changes in demand.
Similarly, Figure 6.13 shows how the results change when we tighten the ramp up and ramp down
constraints by 50%.
Figure 6.11 reveals a few problems of our model. Firstly, we can see that the daily variation in
the calculated price is smaller than in the observed one. Secondly, the two spikes in the observed price
are not captured in our model. Our hypothesis is that the first problem occurs, because our model
does not incorporate the start-up costs of the power plants correctly. Inclusion of the start-up costs
22
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0
1
2
3
4
x 104
Half Hour
D
em
an
d
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pr
ic
e
Coal (calculated)
Gas (calculated)
Calculated Price
Observed Price
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0
1
2
3
4
x 104
Half Hour
D
em
an
d
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Pr
ic
e
Coal (observed)
Gas (observed)
Calculated Price
Observed Price
Figure 6.11. λk = 10
−7 for all k ∈ P ∪ C, ǫ = 0.1, and υ = 10−4.
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Figure 6.12. Ramp up and ramp down constraints are tightened by 20%.
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Figure 6.13. Ramp up and ramp down constraints are tightened by 50%.
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Figure 6.14. Preliminary result after including the startup costs.
exceeds the scope of this paper and will be addressed separately. Some preliminary results are shown
in Figure 6.14. Our hypothesis for the explanation of the second problem is the error in the demand
forecast. Spikes in the spot price occur when there is an unexpected change in demand. Since only a
few (usually rather inefficient Open Cycle Gas Turbine) power plants are flexible enough to cover the
demand, they require a high electricity price to be turned on. Thus, the spikes cannot be forecast two
months before the delivery. An investigation of the predictive power of our model to forecast spikes
closer to delivery is left for future work.
7. Conclusions. In this paper we proposed a tractable quadratic programming reformulation for
calculating the equilibrium term structure of electricity prices in a market with multiple consumers
and producers. Reformulation can be used for solving general equilibrium optimization problems that
include inequality constraints and can be seen as an extension of the shadow price approach.
We have extended the term structure electricity price model proposed in [21] to a more realis-
tic setting by taking into account transaction costs and liquidity considerations as well as realistic
electricity contracts.
The section on numerical results first shows how to calibrate various parameters of the model.
We investigated how different parameters affect the equilibrium electricity price. Interestingly, we
found that consumers have very little power to influence the electricity price. They have to satisfy the
demand of the end users regardless of the price level. To maintain their profitability, they propagate
all increased costs to the end users. Producers, on the other hand, have much more power to affect
the electricity prices. They have a large impact on the price level and a slightly smaller impact on the
term structure itself. The market micro-structure and liquidity of the contracts can significantly affect
the term structure of the electricity price. In an extreme case, changes in the liquidity even altered
the term structure from normal backwardation to contango. The term structure of electricity prices is
also considerably affected by the term structure of fuels and emissions.
We investigated the predictive power of our model when applied to the realistic system of UK
power plants. The results show that our model predicts the prices quite well and that the predicted
price exhibits the main features of the electricity price. Numerical examples show the effect of tightened
ramp up and ramp down constraints. We have also identified two areas where a further improvement
is needed. Some very promising preliminary numerical results of the further improvements are also
included.
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